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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Conventional wisdom posits absence of systematic relationship between economic 
reforms and human rights. Taking the case of transition economies, Vadlamannati & 
Soysa (2008) shows significant positive relationship between economic reforms and 
various forms of human rights. This brings us to the next question on the impact of 
choice and speed of reforms on human rights performance. In other words, does speed 
and choice of reforms increase or decrease government respect for human rights in 
transition economies? This is the question our paper tries to address. The Anglo-Saxon 
perspective is that speed of reforms lead to growth and development which inturn 
generates respect for human rights. While skeptics contend that rushing towards a free 
market economy would always be destructive as development process tends to be 
exclusive creating exogenous shocks leading to social and economic unrest. This leads to 
domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to resort to repressive measures.  
 
We use a new method to construct „speed of reforms‟ variable for transition economies 
for the period 1993 – 2006 to estimate its impact on all forms of human rights. Further, 
using the methodology of Wolf (1999) on discrete groupings of choice of reforms of 
transition economies, we classify the countries under radical, gradual and laggard 
reformer groups. We measure the impact of speed of reforms on human rights 
performance conditioned by choice of reforms.   
 
Our findings show that speed of reforms significantly improves government respect for 
all forms of human rights, while volatility in reforms is associated with human rights 
abuses. But the interesting finding is that, controlling for the speed of reforms attained, 
the choice with which the country has reformed plays pivotal role in determining human 
rights performance. While radical reforming countries are associated with better human 
rights performance, gradualists and laggards share poor human rights performance.    
 
 
Keywords: Speed & choice of economic Reforms; Human rights; Transition economies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between economic reforms and human rights is a contentious issue in 
the international political economy framework. An increasing amount of scholarship is 
likewise being devoted on this issue. But very often the link between the two is not 
properly understood as there are divergent views on this subject. Taking the case of 
transition economies, Vadlamannati & Soysa (2008) shows significant positive 
relationship between economic reforms and various forms of human rights. Thus, the 
focus of this study is not on economic reforms per se, but to explore the relationship 
between speed of economic reforms and government respect for Human rights in 
transition economies. Though there are vast numbers of studies that show positive 
relationship between speed of economic reforms and socioeconomic development
1
, the 
consequences of speed and choice of economic reforms leading to human rights abuses 
remain highly litigious. Added to this, lack of any systematic empirical work on this topic 
makes it even more difficult to understand and is far from clear.  
 
The literature till date presents conflicting findings on the relationship between speed and 
choice of reforms and socioeconomic development in transition economies, which is a 
key determinant of human rights performance. The pro liberal groups argue that countries 
which adopt radical economic reforms ensure speedy reforms and thereby experience 
higher economic growth and development. This however increases government respect 
for human rights. It is believed that speedy reforms process is most likely to affect human 
rights positively as it help improving quality of life. It help promote economic 
development, institutional efficiencies creating employment opportunities and reduce 
income inequality and poverty thereby leading to decline in social unrest and economic 
insecurity. However, another set of researchers question the validity of the argument that 
speed of reforms lead to greater human rights respect. They argue that greater the speed 
of reforms, higher the economic and social inequalities through negative feedback 
running from development to reforms. This creates negative exogenous shocks in the 
form of greater economic insecurity and social unrest paving way for the risk of political 
instability and outbreak of conflicts thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Rodrik, 1997; 
Rodrik, 1998). Thus, the governments are forced to use repressive measures and there by 
human rights abuses. Despite these many divergent views, any clear-cut evidence on the 
relationship between speed of reforms and human rights performance is lacking. The 
question whether speed of economic reforms improves human rights is yet unsettled.  
 
While most have focused on the linkage between speed of economic reforms and 
socioeconomic conditions, the questions about choice of reforms remains unanswered. 
The great debate on the speed of economic reforms cropped up at the early stages of 
                                                 
1
 There is an extensive research on impact of economic reforms and growth in transition economies. These 
include: De Melo et al. (1996); Fischer et al. (1996); De Melo et al. (1997); Fidrmuc, (2001); Karsten, 
(2005) and Young & Hyung (2006). They all show that economic reform has a direct impact on economic 
growth. White & Leavy (2000) have found the same for a set of 20 developing countries. Similar such 
findings were found for China by Ligang & Yu (2008).  Other studies related to impact of economic 
reforms include: Li (1997); Lederman & Soare (2001); Basu (2004); Mwangi (2006) Vadlamannati & 
Vasquez (2008) and Vadlamannati (2008).  
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transition. One set of experts argued for what is called as „shock therapy‟ or „big bang‟, 
which advocates for faster economic reforms and radical transformation. Another set of 
researchers‟ cautioned against rapid reforms, voting for cautious approach to reforms 
process. These are popularly known to be „gradualists‟. It seems appropriate in the case 
of transition economies to gauge the impact of choice of speed of economic reforms on 
various forms of human rights performance. If found that speed of reforms improve 
human rights performance, then it would be interesting to see whether positive effect of 
speed of reforms is conditioned by which choice of reforms. These are the questions we 
try to address in this paper. Seeking to provide some empirical insight on this, we employ 
panel data for 26 transition economies over the period 1993 – 2006 and make use of a 
new measure of variable which would define „speed of reforms‟ to assess whether and to 
what extent speed of reforms affect human rights and its direction. 
 
1. 1. Economic Reforms, Social & Economic costs 
 
The transition economies are in the process of transiting not only from autocratic to 
democratic setup, but also from centrally planned to free market economic system. In the 
process all these countries have agreed upon common elements of the transition process. 
They adopted macroeconomic liberalization and stabilization polices, popularly known as 
economic reforms program. Thus thrust was laid on liberalizing state controlled prices to 
be freely determined by the market, lowering tariff and non tariff barriers, opening up of 
the economy for foreign investors and integrating the price structure with that of world 
market. The macroeconomic stabilization focused on lowering towering inflation rates 
which these countries have experienced during the initial years of transition through 
disciplined fiscal and monetary measures. This apart, the reforms also focused on 
privatization, legal and institutional reforms to strengthen the state. As these countries 
started the process of transition, they started facing economic and social hardships. Policy 
makers in these economies faced with extreme discrepancies about the path to be adopted 
which would have lower economic and social costs. A major debate took place about the 
merits of fast or “radical” reforms to “gradual” reforms. Some were of the view the rapid 
reforms would be destructive given the fact that economies are transiting from centrally 
planned setup to more free market economy. Others felt that piecemeal reforms would 
ensure slower growth and development as gestation period to reap the potential benefits 
would be longer. But as it turned out, many transition economies plunged ahead with 
„radical transformation‟ style of reforms. The initial objective of the reforms was to 
quickly implement the following: macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization, 
reduction of direct subsidies, removal of entry barriers to the creation of new firms, 
carrying out small-scale privatization, and introduction of a social safety net. After well 
succeeding in effective implementation, the second phase of reforms include more 
comprehensive type of reforms which focused on building institutional setup, like: large-
scale privatization, in-depth development of a commercial banking system, taxation 
reforms, labor market regulations and institutions related to the social safety net, and 
establishment and enforcement of a market oriented legal system.  
 
However, many blamed „shock therapy / radical reforms‟ because it worsened instead of 
improving the economic and social conditions of the people. All countries experienced 
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significant drop in their GDP growth rates with shift towards agriculture and services 
sector and very high rates of inflation. During the structural shift from industry to 
agriculture and services
2
, many left unemployed and there was substantial reduction in 
wages of laborers
3
. This move not only created unemployment but led to 
underemployment in all these countries. This led to rapid increase in income inequality 
paving way for higher levels of poverty
4
. It is estimated that about half of the population 
in Armenia and Kyrgyz Republic were under severe poverty during the transition period 
though out the 1990s (Spoor, 2003). On the other hand, majority of the countries saw 
their savings rate decline drastically between 1990 and 2001. Some countries like 
Armenia witnessed negative savings rate forcing to relay heavily on remittances from 
abroad from its diaspora. Adding fuel to fire, rapid financial liberalization as a strategy of 
„shock therapy‟ process led to greater increase in interest rate spread. This effectively 
means very high interest rates, discouraging investment opportunities in the countries 
arising from complete failure of banking system role as intermediary between financial 
development and economic growth. All these forced governments to relay heavily on 
external debt, aid and inflow of foreign funds.   
 
On the name of rapid economic reforms, greater economic freedom allowed wealthy to 
exercise their economic rights to accumulate the wealth, while majority of the population 
were languishing below poverty line. Many started questioning the credibility of 
economic reforms process which led to uneven growth and equity in these countries 
during the initial stages of transition
5
. Haddad (1998) quoted from a Russian reported 
interview of a citizen: 
 
“…..I am tired of all this stuff about economic freedom, we need work NOT freedom……” 
 
Thus, reforms created a sense of economic insecurity among the people during the initial 
stages of implementing the reforms with rapid pace. Haddad (1998) opines that, “without 
economic security one cannot formulate and pursue a life plan of one's own choosing. 
One would always be engaged in survival activities with little or no time left for self-
reflection and self-development.” One of the major problems was clearly the worst initial 
conditions and recession that made all the countries go through painful transition during 
the early 1990s. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, situation looked quite better. This improvement is led by 
Poland which largely succeeded in creating free market economy. Poland was followed 
by Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia republic. However, the 
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 For example, in Armenia, the industry shape to GDP fell from 52% in 1990 to under 34% in 2002. But 
during the same period the share of Agriculture in GDP increased from 17% to 30%. In Kyrgyz Republic 
industry share fell from 36% to 26%, Uzbekistan from 33% to 22% and Mongolia 30% to 17% to highlight 
a few (World Development Indicators, 2006).  
3
 For example, the unemployment rate was16% in Bulgaria and Poland, 12% in Hungary and Slovakia, 
10% in Romania, 9% in Slovenia (Svejnar, 2001). 
4
 For example in Russia and Uzbekistan, the Gini was around 57% during early 1990s. 
5
 Many public opinion surveys for example in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary shows that majority of 
individuals felt that it is not useful to change the political and economic system. Vast majority also felt that 
losses from transition exceeded the gains (Public Opinion Research Center, 1999 quoted in Svejnar, 2001). 
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performance of many other transition economies has fallen short of expectations. Many 
could not recover from the initial shocks and worse recession rose from implementing 
rapid economic reforms. Thus, moving from pervasive state control regime towards a free 
market economy during the mid 1990s remained partial. Except a few, many countries 
did not even dare to implement the reforms which focused on setting up institutional 
structure. The standard of living of people declined as there was uneven progress and 
development within the countries and between the countries which increased inequality 
levels increasing poverty
6
 to higher levels. During this period, many countries also 
witnessed rapid rise in mortality and death rates. Thus, far from experiencing economic 
growth and development, there was complete economic and social chaos, which surprised 
many neoliberals who have called for radical reforms. On the other hand, critics of 
radical reforms pressed for gradualistic approach in implementing economic reforms. 
 
Literature on reforms and human rights show that when the new form of polices are 
designed and adopted swiftly, it leads to wide spread agitation to resist making 
substantial policy changes in the fear that it could affect the vast sections of the 
population. This most of the times leads to angry mob protests or conflicts, or even 
deadly civil war, like in the case of some of these transition economies in the early phases 
of transition
7
, forcing the governments to adopt repressive tactics (Davenport, 1995; 
Davidson 2002 and Fields, 2003).  
 
However, despite the painful transition process led by radical economic reforms, almost 
all the transition economies have witnessed piecemeal success post 2000. 
Macroeconomic stabilization yielded small successes as inflation in majority of the 
countries is brought under control. Economic growth is slowly back on the track and 
institutional reforms such as antimonopoly law, regulatory setups, competition policy, 
corruption laws are underway. Some of the Central & East European countries like 
Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania and Romania have started witnessing the 
fruits of economic reforms. Infact countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Poland are now 
member states of EU. In a report published by IMF (2000) says that Freedom House 
classified 20 transition countries under the category of „free‟ or „partly free‟ for political 
and civil liberties.  
 
The study on transition economies is a unique case in comparative economies as all these 
economies started transiting roughly at same point of time. Different countries had 
                                                 
6
 For a detailed study on impact of speedy transition on poverty, inequality and conflicts, see Ellman, 
(2000); World Bank (2001); Van Tongeren, et al. (2002) and Spoor (2003).  
7
 The early transition period was characterized by violent local armed conflicts in these economies. Large 
scale of conflicts in the form of civil war and local conflicts in transition economies include: Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan and Georgia. According to UNHCR 
(2002 & 2003), Statistical Yearbook 2001 and UNICEF (2003), the human cost of these local conflicts was 
that over 200,000 were reported to be dead and refugees and internally displaced population numbers were 
in millions. While Bosnia & Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia); Croatia and Kosovo (Serbia and 
Montenegro) and Macedonia experienced international armed conflicts leading to around 330,000 deaths 
and over 15,00,000 were internally displayed population and refugees (UNICEF, 2001, 2003 and 2003). 
These internally displaced population and refugees belong to the most poorest section of the society (Spoor, 
2003). 
 5 
varying initial conditions (World Bank, 2000; Swinnen, 2003) and adopted different 
routes of implementing economic reforms process at different speed (Kolodko, 2000). 
Almost all the transition economies have faced economic and social hardships during 
their transition leading to inequality, poverty and conflicts, thereby human rights 
violations. But now majority of them are exhibiting very high but varying speed in 
further implementing economic reforms. Their comparative experiences thus provide a 
unique opportunity to study the interactions amongst the choice and speed of reforms and 
their impact on human rights performance.  
 
Rest of the paper is structured as follows: next section presents the theoretical arguments 
of modernists versus traditionalists. We introduce our measures of human rights, speed 
and choice of economic reforms in section three. In section four we explain our empirical 
results and section five concludes the study. Lastly, we test the robustness of the results 
and are presented in Annexures. 
 
2. Speed of Reforms & Human Rights – The Interrelationship 
 
It is well know that both theoretical and empirical literature on relationship between 
economic reforms and human rights give contradictory picture. Though there is no direct 
relationship established with respect to speed and choice of reforms and human rights 
performance, we identify two schools of thoughts viz., Anglo-Saxon and critical schools 
of thought arguing for and against the choice and speed of reforms and their implications 
on socioeconomic conditions, which has direct impact on human rights conditions. The 
Anglo-Saxon school of thought rallies its support behind speedy reforms which are 
beneficial for economy in long run and hence positive affect on human rights, while 
critical school of thought argues otherwise. We present the theoretical underpinnings of 
both schools of thoughts.   
 
2. 1. Anglo-Saxon Perspective 
 
The Anglo-Saxon group argues in favour of speedy reforms process which would provide 
economic, social and political benefits. If this materializes, the implications of this would 
be increase in human rights respect. The figure 1 depicts this chain relationship between 
speed of reforms and human rights performance. There is a vast amount of literature 
which show that developed countries often tend have greater respect for all forms of 
human rights (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999 and Milner, Leblang & Poe, 2004). Essentially 
the basic objective behind initiation of economic reforms program in the case of 
transition economies is to move towards a free market economy and progress towards 
greater development. Advocating for a faster transition, Lipton & Sachs (1990) assert 
political and economic logic for faster economic reforms. Supporting this view are Klaus 
(1993), Balcerowicz & Gelb (1994) who argue that faster reforms process has 
comparative advantage over piecemeal reforms process. Infact there are many studies 
who found empirical support for the view that speedy reforms lead to higher growth and 
development. The study of World Development Report conducted by Melo, Denizer & 
Gelb (1996, was the first and later 1997a, 1997b) found support for this argument. 
Similarly, Sachs (1996) and Sachs & Woo (1997) find that “faster reform was associated 
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with higher, not lower, growth.” Echoing the same views are some of the prominent 
studies of Fischer, Sahay & Vegh (1997, a & b); Krueger & Ciolko (1996); Angjellari-
Dajci (2002); Fischer & Sahay (2000); Havrylyshyn et al. (1998 & 2000); Jaros (2001); 
Campos & Coricelli (2002) and World Bank (2002)
8
. Employing different methods of 
speed of reforms, Heybey & Murrell (1997); Hallagan & Jun (2000); Popov (2000); 
Staehr (2003) and Lee & Jeong (2006) finds that speedy reforms are beneficial for 
transition economies in long term but its effect is limited in short and medium term. 
Fidrmuc (2001) finds that “…On the one hand, countries that postponed radical reforms 
or implemented them more gradually may have succeeded in avoiding some of the 
adverse effects experienced by the more reform-enthusiastic countries. Nevertheless, such 
intermediate reforms apparently did not prevent disorganization effects (see Blanchard 
and Kremer, 1997; and Roland and Verdier, 1999) from occurring eventually. On the 
contrary, the outcome of the intermediate reform is worse than either that of a full reform 
or of no reform….”  
 
Figure 1: Liberal perspective on Speed of Reforms & Human Rights 
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 Most of these studies use sum or average of various reform indices or cumulative liberalization index 
developed by Melo et al. (1996) and show that reforms are correlated with growth. 
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Arguing against gradualist approach of reforms, Anglo-Saxons‟ feel that the potential 
gains arising from economic reforms would be very limited if the government adopts 
gradualist approach in implementing the reforms. The piecemeal reforms process would 
not only take longer time to gain the potential benefits, but would give scope for 
reversing the reforms policies leading to macroeconomic uncertainty. The piecemeal 
approach of reforms endangers economic security of the people due to limited gains from 
half baked policies like dismantling administered price mechanism without actually 
curbing monopoly, resorting to piecemeal privatization with an objective to fund the 
fiscal deficit, attracting FDI by placing higher sectoral caps on equity investments, 
increase in social sector spending without formulating appropriate schemes for 
unemployment benefit and pension policies. Giving support to this viewpoint is 
Dabrowski (1996) who argues that “the faster and more comprehensive the economic 
reform, the more chance there is to minimize its economic, social, and political costs, and 
to avoid chronic macroeconomic mismanagement. A more radical and disciplined path of 
transition is all the more important when initial conditions are less favorable and 
negative external shocks are greater.” All these studies indicate that speedy reforms are 
beneficial for growth
9
. The literature on human rights shows that growth and 
development process are associated with government respect for human rights. Thus, 
speedy economic reforms help achieve growth and development which should eventually 
lead to human rights respect. Obviously, when the growth and development process tends 
to be „inclusive‟ (creation of equal economic opportunities to all sections in the society) 
there will be a positive feedback from development to choice of reforms and vulnerability 
to exogenous shocks would be less.    
 
The other key objective of economic reforms is reducing the role of state in economic 
affairs. Experts like Cranston (1964) and Bergh (2006) argue that government respect for 
human rights would increase if the role of the state is curtailed
10
. Neoliberal economists 
believe that economic reforms process over the period of time help reduce the size of the 
government. Advocates of speedy reforms also agree on this as Balcerowicz (1993) feels 
that one way to reduce the role of state would be to implement economic reforms at faster 
pace. Faster reforms ensure transition process to be irreversible. Rapid reforms process 
lead to drastic changes interms of economic and institutional aspects that creates political 
constraints for the governments in future when attempting for a reversal and thereby 
reducing its role in economic affairs of the state.  
 
Growth and development (assuming exogenous shocks to be less due to positive feedback 
running from development to choice of reforms) led by limited role of state help create 
conducive business environment. This improves investments creating job opportunities 
leading to decline in poor socioeconomic conditions (William et. al, 1978; Rothgeb, 
1989; Robert, 1995; IMF, 1997; Zhao, 1998). There is also vast amount of literature 
which confirms that indeed economic growth and development lead to positive effect on 
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 There is vast literature on the relationship between economic reforms and growth in transition economies. 
But Havrylyshyn (2001) captures extensive literature review on this aspect.  
10
 See Hayek (1984) for a detailed linkage between the importance of role of the state and human freedom. 
Also see the speech of Prof. Milton Friedman on "Economic Freedom, Human Freedom & Political 
Freedom" delivered at Smith Center in Nov. 1991.  
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socioeconomic conditions (Moon & Dixon, 1985; Spalding, 1986; Park, 1987; Milner, 
Poe & Leblang, 1999; Milner, 2000; Milner, Leblang & Poe, 2004). The improvement in 
socioeconomic conditions leads to creating peaceful conditions in the home through 
lower social and economic unrest (Flanagan & Fogelman, 1971; Jacobsen, 1996) and 
thereby increasing government respect for human rights.   
 
2. 2. Alternative Perspective 
 
The second school of thought questions the role of speed of reforms in promoting 
socioeconomic development.  Though they agree with trickle down process that reforms 
increase human rights, they argue that this can also have negative effect if the growth and 
development process led by speedy reforms remains “exclusive”.  Infact the studies by 
Aslund, Boone & Johnson (1996) find that there is no robust significant correlation 
between growth and economic reforms. Also, Falcetti et al. (2002) and Merlevede (2003) 
find less robust results on impact of economic reforms on economic growth.  
 
Figure 2: Alternative perspective on Speed of Reforms & Human Rights 
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They argue that the reason for previous studies finding significant positive effect was due 
to the simultaneity bias between reforms and growth. Radulescu et al. (2002) arrive at 
similar conclusions. Moreover, they argue that lack of market supporting institutional 
mechanism is the root cause for the failure of radical reforms process. This is exactly 
what was argued by Siebert, Raiser & Langhammer (1996) who lays emphasis on 
reforms related to microeconomic factors and not on macroeconomic factors. This is even 
more evident in the case of transition economies and hence the Anglo-Saxon perspective 
is held inappropriate by its critics. Many experts like Kornai, (1992, 1994); Dewatripont 
& Roland (1992); Laban & Wolf (1993); Murrell (1993, 1995) and Taylor (1994) all 
argue in favour of building up proper institutional structure which includes: protection of 
property rights, effective regulations, efficient legal protection, placing proper social 
security measures, creating accessible distributional networks, removal of money 
constraints and stringent labour regulations, before undertaking radical economic reforms 
process. Failing to do so would be disastrous as many economies in the early transition 
phase faced with confusion and lack of consensus among which policy to be embraced 
and have adopted radical reforms measures and were made to suffer. For example, on one 
hand, price liberalization reforms were adopted very swiftly without proper institutional 
support (like access to credit, distributional networks and lack of protection of legal and 
property rights) for the new entrants to break the existing monopolies. On the other hand 
due to inappropriate government spendings many witnessed huge fiscal deficits, both 
leading to hyperinflation across the region
11
. Exactly during this time, many countries 
also witnessed steep fall in GDP growth rates compared to the level of pre-transition 
(EBRD, 1996). This led to huge unemployment crisis in the region. All this had a 
tremendous impact on the standard of living of the people. The empirical study by 
Brainerd (1998) shows that the speed with which the economic reforms were introduced 
resulted in significant rise in poverty levels contributing to increase in mortality and 
death rates. Due to higher budgetary constraints the governments borrowed heavily, 
cutting the developmental spending on education, health, social security and welfare 
measures leading to greater amount of inequality. All these resulted in increasing crime 
rate, riots and civil conflicts in the region.  
 
Another argument put forth is about initiating inappropriate economic reforms polices 
and resorting to swift implementation of these  polices lead to “exclusive” economic 
growth and development process. This gives rise to negative feedback to reforms leading 
to exogenous shocks in the form of rise in inflation, unemployment, and increase in 
income and wage inequalities leading to stagnant poverty levels. Thus, the poor 
socioeconomic conditions generate greater economic insecurity and social unrest creating 
hardships to the poorer sections of the society (Veerland, 2002). This often paves way for 
public protests, strikes and lockouts risking political instability and outbreak of conflicts 
thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; Rodrik, 1997a, b; Rodrik, 1998; 
Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000; Blinder, 2006 and Krugman, 2007) leading to government 
resorting to repressive measures (see figure 2).  
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 Many countries had fiscal deficit in double digits; some even had as much as 58% and inflation touched 
five digit marks. Georgia had 15606.5% annual inflation in 1994. Similarly, Azerbaijan had 1129.04% & 
11664% in 1993, 1994 respectively. Armenia had 5244.20% inflation in 1994; Belarus faced 1190% in 
1993 & 2221% in 1994, while Bulgaria in 1997 saw inflation touching 1058%, Croatia has 1500% in 1993.    
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3. Modeling “Human rights and Speed & Choice of Reforms”  
 
To investigate the impact of choice and speed of reforms on Human rights performance, 
it is convenient to define what we considered by Human Rights performance. The 
concept of Human Rights performance has always been problematic. However, we take 
into account all those aspects which are related to abuses of human rights. Basically, we 
consider the “integrity of people”, “empowerment rights of people” and “state terrorism”. 
To capture these broad issues, we take into account two widely used indicators in 
literature dealing with Human rights abuses. These indicators are physical integrity rights 
index and empowerment rights index
12
. Similar to Dreher, Gassebner & Siemers (2007) 
we use two indices in our analysis. 
 
a. Physical Integrity Rights Index 
 
The physical integrity rights index reported in the Human rights database (CIRI) contain 
information about the pattern and sequence of government respect for physical integrity 
rights in addition to the level. Here, the pattern is defined as “the association of different 
levels of government respect for several physical integrity rights with a single, overall 
scale score” (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). Sequence is defined as “the order in which 
governments have a propensity to violate particular physical integrity rights” 
(Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). The CIRI data are based on the human rights practices of 
governments and any of its agents, such as police or paramilitary forces. The CIRI 
measure is an additive index constructed from observations on torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances. It ranges from 0, meaning no 
government respect for these four human rights to 8, or full government respect for these 
four human rights. 
 
b. Empowerment Rights Index 
 
Empowerment rights index is a more general way of defining human rights, which 
extends beyond state terrorism and includes various other issues related to political and 
civil rights of the people. The government respect for political and civil rights is a 10-
point additive scale constructed using probabilistic cumulative scale analysis (Richards, 
Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). This is an additive index constructed from the freedom of 
movement, freedom of speech, workers‟ rights, political participation, and freedom of 
religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 
(full government respect for these five rights). The source of information used for coding 
these five variables was from the U.S. State Department's annual country reports on 
Human rights practices. To check for robustness of these two indices, we also run the 
results by taking into consideration civil liberties and political freedom constructed by 
Freedom House. 
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 See Carleton & Stohl (1987); Gibney & Dalton (1997); Poe & Meernik (1995); Poe & Tate (1994); Stohl 
et al. (1984); Cingranelli & Richards (1999); Richards (1998); Zanger (2000); Neumayer (2005); Dreher, 
Gassebner & Siemers (2007) and Eriksen & de Soysa (2008). 
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Thus, in the first model Physical Integrity Rights variable is considered as dependent, 
while the second model considers Empowerment Rights index. Therefore, the two 
parsimonious models for Human rights performance are specified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (2) 
 
Where: i t = country “i” at time “t”;    = Intercept for the equations;  Ω = Regression 
Coefficients for variable “n”; ε γ = error terms for country “i” at time “t”. Obviously, the 
hypothesis variables are speed and choice of reforms, but a detailed discussion on 
construction of these two variables along with other alternative measured variables is 
discussed in the next section 3.1.  
 
This empirical analysis covers 26 transition economies (13 CIS, three Baltic and 10 
Central & East European countries, see annexure 1) for the period 1993 to 2006. We use 
pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) to fixed effects method because some of the 
variables like democracy scores and ethnic fractionalization index are time invariant 
series. We estimate all models using year dummies to estimate any effects of trending 
data. However, the pooled time-series cross-sectional (TCSC) data may exhibit 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. While these problems do not bias the 
estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for 
large sample consisting of cross section and time series data. However, they often tend to 
cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To 
deal with these problems, we estimated for all the models the Huber-White robust 
standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are robust to 
both Heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation within the cross-section 
unit (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000).  
 
 
 
Physical Integrity Rights = 1 + 2 HYPOTHESIS VARIABLES it + 3 Economic Growth Rate it +  
4 log (Economic Development) it + 5 War years it + 6 Pace years it + 7 
Political Regime it + 8 log (Population)it + 9 Ethnic Fractionalization it + 10 
British / Socialist Legal System it  + 11 Oil Exports it  + 12 log (Reforms 
years / Communist years) it  + 13 Time it + εit 
Empowerment Rights = 1 + Ω2 HYPOTHESIS VARIABLES it + Ω3 Economic Growth Rate it +  
Ω4 log (Economic Development) it + Ω5 War years it + Ω6 Pace years it + Ω7 
Political Regime it + Ω8 log (Population)it + Ω9 Ethnic Fractionalization it + 
Ω10 British / Socialist Legal System it  + Ω11 Oil Exports it  + Ω12 log (Reforms 
years / Communist years) it  + Ω13 Time it + γit 
 
 
 12 
3. 1. Main independent variables: „Hypothesis variables‟ 
 
a. Speed of Economic Reforms 
 
There is a considerable amount literature to estimate the effects of speed of economic 
reforms on the long run rate of growth of output of the theoretical growth models and 
socioeconomic development process. In many of these studies speed of economic reforms 
is measured either by a simple dummy variable or by calculating rate of growth of 
economic reforms index (Merlevede & Schoors, 2004 and Vadlamannati & Vasquez 
2008). Later on, other measures of reforms were developed using different methods. The 
well known Melo, Denizer & Gelb (1996) speed of reforms variable is based on 
cumulative index of economic reforms. In the first place, they developed an index which 
measures economic reforms. Liberalization in internal markets, external markets, and 
private sector entry were considered to develop the reforms index with weights assigned 
0.30 for the first two and 0.40 for the last indicator. The data set includes annual 
measures on these three components for 28 transition economies from 1989 to 1995. In 
the next stage, they computed the cumulative variable of this reforms index which is the 
sum of all previous annual liberalization indices from 1989 onwards, to make it a proxy 
for speed of reforms. Using this index, Melo, Denizer & Gelb (1996) show that speed of 
reforms has a positive impact of economic growth in transition economies. This study 
was followed by Fischer, Sahay & Vegh (1997, a & b); Krueger & Ciolko (1996); 
Angjellari-Dajci (1999); Fischer & Sahay (2000); Havrylyshyn et al. (1998 & 2000); 
Jaros (2001); Campos & Coricelli (2002), all using the cumulative reforms index as 
proxy for speed of reforms and found positive effect on output.  
 
Others, while accepting economic reforms index is an important to measure of speed of 
reforms, argued that the major drawback with this cumulative reforms index is that it 
does not distinguish between policy and policy changes. Meaning, the index do not 
reflect changes in the reforms policy, rather it reflects the position of policy. Another 
major problem with this method is that it fails to distinguish the effect of speed of 
reforms between the countries. This means the countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia 
which started economic reforms before 1989, will have a higher cumulative index to 
other transition economies, suggesting that speed of reforms in these three countries are 
higher. Another drawback of this method is that it fails to recognize the countries which 
see no change in economic reforms in the current year and yet the cumulative reforms 
index will still increase for these countries. For example if a country has a reforms score 
of 4 in the starting year and has not undertaken any reforms measures in the next 2 years 
will have a score of 12 at the end of third year. On the other hand, a country with an 
initial score of 2 under takes reforms in the next two years with scores of 5 each would 
also have the score of 12 at the end of third year. This is because of the additive property 
of this measure, which makes it biased. There are also studies like Sachs‟ & Woo (1997) 
used EBRD‟s economic reforms index as proxy for speed of reforms. This index range 
between 1 and 4.3, 1 means centrally planned economy and 4.3 is full free market 
economy. This is also not a perfect method to measure the speed of reforms simply 
because this index tells us the state of reforms at current point of time rather than the pace 
at which reforms are being introduced. Therefore all these measures which are used as 
proxies for speed of reforms are incomprehensive methods.  
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Taking into account these loopholes, Heybey & Murrell (1997) and Fleisher, Sabirianova 
& Wang (2004) constructed speed of reforms variable using three disaggregate 
liberalization indices developed by Melo, Denizer & Gelb (1996). The index is 
constructed as, “Speed equals one fourth of the difference between the value of the 
liberalization index in the fourth year of post-communist reform and the value of the 
liberalization index in the last year of the old regime (L0), capturing the extent of policy 
change. L0 is also included in the equation, because the degree of liberalization at the 
beginning of post-communist reforms is expected to affect growth performance” (Heybey 
& Murrell, 1997). This method certainly takes into account the concerns raised above. 
However, this speed of reforms variable is constructed only for single point of time, i.e. 
for the year 1995. Our study is a cross sectional time series ranging from 1993 to 2006. 
Thus, we come up with our method of constructing time series index keeping in mind the 
concerns raised above. The speed of reforms index is: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Where, t is current year; economic reforms is the EBRD‟s economic reforms index; first 
year of new regime is the year in which the country attained independence and total 
transition years include count of all the years starting from 1990 to 2006. The main 
advantage of using this method is that it help distinguish between policy of reforms per se 
and reforms policy changes by using separate variables to measure speed of economic 
reforms and initial conditions of reforms. 
 
b. Alternative measures of Speed of Reforms 
 
Apart from our standard measure of speed of reforms, we make use of other alternative 
measures of speed of reforms to cross check our results. To this end, we use two different 
methods which include: 
 
i. Residual method 
 
There is a wide range of debate amongst researchers about the determinants of human 
rights in the context of speed of economic reforms. One set of researchers argue that 
speed of reforms determine human rights performances in transition economies. While 
another set of research group argues that initial conditions are the most important factor 
which actually increases the pace of reforms and thereby determines human rights 
performance.  Therefore taking into consideration both these arguments shows that speed 
of reforms is infact determined by initial conditions. This apart other key variables 
include: economic output, economic performance and political constraints.  Since reform 
speed itself is predicted to be a function of starting positions, solving this problem 
includes two step procedures: 
 
Speed of reforms it = 0 + β1 Initial Conditions it + β2 Control Variables it +  it 
……………………………… (3) 
Economic Reforms in t – Economic reforms position in first year of new regime 
 
Total number of years in transition/reforms 
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We run this pooled regression model for equation (3) and from the estimates of (3) 
residuals { it} are obtained. These are the variations in speed of reforms distinct to their 
respective starting positions. The second step includes: 
 
Physical Integrity Rights it = 0 + 1 { it} + 2 Control Variables it +   it 
 
……………………………… (4) 
 
Empowerment Rights it = 0 + ώ1 { it} + ώ 2 Control Variables it +  it 
 
……………………………… (5) 
 
The residuals { it} from the estimated speed of reforms equation, (residual speed of 
reforms = actual speed of reforms – predicted speed of reforms), is used as an 
explanatory variable in the estimations (4 & 5). This we name it as “variation in speed of 
reforms”, obtained through „residual method‟. We make use of this new variable to 
replace our first speed of reforms variable to check for variability of the results.  
 
ii. Cumulative Reforms Index  
 
As highlighted earlier, many studies have used cumulative reforms index as a proxy for 
speed of reforms. The cumulative reforms index not only measures the state of reforms in 
the current year, but also includes the sum of previous years‟ reforms efforts of a country. 
The EBRD‟s economic reforms index is used for this purpose. Thus, the sum of all the 
previous years reforms index will help obtain the information about the extent of reforms 
undertaken in earlier years. Justifying the usage of such cumulative indices as proxy for 
speed of reforms, Melo, Denizer & Gelb (1996) points out that “...at any given moment, 
economic performance will not be determined by the degree of liberalization in that 
moment alone; it will also be shaped by institutional and behavioral changes stimulated 
by prior policy reforms”. Thus, taking this argument into consideration, we include this 
measure at the later stage of the analysis to check for robustness of the results.  
 
c. Choice of Reforms 
 
Apart from measuring speed of reforms, there is also a wide range of debate on 
quantifying the choice of reforms adopted by various transition economies. As 
highlighted in figures 1 and 2, the choice of reforms which a country prefers to adopt 
would very well influence the socioeconomic performance. This also has 
positive/negative feedback running from performance to the choice of reforms, which 
inturn determine the pace of reforms. Many countries followed variety strategies to carry 
forward their reforms agenda. Lack of any systematic evidence of choice effects of 
reforms on socioeconomic conditions stems from the complications related to 
measurement of such variable. It is very difficult to quantify and construct measurable 
hypothesis variables, radical and gradual reforms. To this end, we make use of the 
information provided by Wolf (1999) on discrete groupings of choice of reforms of 
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transition economies. This discrete groupings classify the choice of reforms adopted by 
various countries under three heads viz., radicals, gradualists and laggards.  
 
Following the Wolf (1999) method, each country adopting reform path is defined as 
radical/gradualist/ laggard based on the following information: 
 
Radical Reformers: If EBRD‟s economic reforms index increased by atleast the value of  
1.0 in any given two year period and equals to or above the score of 
3.0 at the end of the sample period (i.e. 2006) is known to be a 
radical reformer. In other words, if a country satisfies this 
condition, it means that the country is inching closer towards a free 
market economy pretty fast. 
  
Gradual Reformers: If EBRD‟s economic reforms index do not increase by 1.0 in any  
point of time in whole sample period but has the final score of 3.0 
at the end of the sample period then the country is known to be a 
gradual reformer. Meaning, country is moving gradually closer 
towards a free market economy. 
 
Laggard Reformers: If EBRD‟s economic reforms index do not increase by 1.0 in any  
point of time in whole sample period and also the final score of 3.0 
at the end of the sample period is not reached, then the country is 
known to be a laggard. This means the country is very far away in 
moving towards a free market economy. 
 
Transition economies like, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Albania, 
Hungary have adopted radical reforms with focus on stabilization and rapid liberalization 
achieved through large scale privatization, no restrictions on entry of private and foreign 
firms, taxation reforms and labor market regulatory reforms. The countries like, Slovenia, 
Romania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Latvia, Kyrgyz Republic followed gradual reforms 
process, while rest of the countries are laggards in implementing the reforms process, 
which means they neither satisfy the conditions of radical reforms process nor gradual 
reforms (see annexure 2). An important distinction between gradual reformers and 
laggards is made only to highlight that in sample there are certain countries which are 
implementing full economic reforms but in slow pace in comparison to countries whose 
pace is not only very slow, but have almost halted implementing economic reforms. 
 
Using this measure, we create two variables namely, choice of reforms and interactive 
effect between choice and speed of reforms. We formulate three variables by name, 
radical reformers, gradual reformers and laggards to provide ordinal rating: 
 
Radical reformer = “1” if the country belongs to this group; otherwise “0” 
 
Gradual reformer = “1” if the country belongs to this group; otherwise “0” 
 
Laggard reformer = “1” if the country belongs to this group; otherwise “0” 
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To measure the impact of speed of reforms on human rights performance conditioned by 
choice of reforms, we interact each dummy variable (radical reformers, gradual reformers 
and laggards) with speed of reforms variable.  
 
d. Volatility in Economic Reforms 
 
We are also interested in probing the impact of volatility in economic reforms process on 
human rights performance in transition economies. Though there are several studies 
which have focused on implications of reforms on socioeconomic conditions, the impact 
of volatility in economic reforms process is largely neglected and untouched. This is very 
important for transition countries because a higher volatility in economic reforms brings 
uncertainty in macroeconomic policy framework. This affects the socioeconomic 
conditions of the people at large, leading to chaos and civil disorder. This has a direct 
effect on human rights conditions as governments would resort to repression to contain 
civil disorder. We compute the volatility in economic reforms taking EBRD‟s economic 
reforms index. 
 
t
ERI   
=  t-1
ERI  
+ t-2
ERI  
+ t-3
ERI  
+ t-4
ERI  
+ t-5
ERI 
 
…………………………….. (6) 
 
t
ERI 
is volatility in actual Economic Reforms Index (ERI) in current year (t). The 
volatility in economic reforms is simply the standard deviation of actual ERI for t-1, t-2, 
t-3, t-4 and t-5 years.    
 
3. 2. Control Variables 
 
Previous research on the violations of human rights has established several key factors 
that explain why governments violate human rights (McKilay & Cohan, 1975; Strouse & 
Claude, 1976; Park, 1987; Cingranelli, 1992; Poe & Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995, 1996, 
1997; King, 1999; Poe, Tate & Linda, 1999; Carey & Poe, 2004 and Landman, 2005). 
Using their arguments, we divide these control variables into two subheads namely, 
institutional and economic variables. The variables under later group include: economic 
growth; economic development and abundant natural resources. The variables selected 
under former head include: population pressures; democracy levels; civil war presence; 
civil peace years; ethnic fractionalization and British/Socialist legal heritage. 
 
The literature shows that there is a positive impact of development and equity on human 
rights (Mitchell & Mc Cormick, 1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Marks & Diamond, 
1992; Davenport 1995; Blanton, 1999; Frey et al., 1999; Milner, 2002; Richards, Gelleny 
& Sacko, 2001; Sen 1999; Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2005; 
Blanton & Blanton, 2006; Eriksen & de Soysa, 2008; Vadlamannati & Tamazian, 2007 
and Vadlamannati & de Soysa 2008). The models control the effects of development and 
growth by introducing logged value of per capita GDP in US$ PPP constant terms and 
the economic growth rate. The data for both these variables come from world 
development indicators of World Bank 2006.  
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On institutional factors, literature shows that the level of democracy is a key variable 
associated with human rights. The democracy scores take shape as a discrete variable 
taking the value 1 if the polity IV, variable polity II, is greater than 6 on the 10-point 
scale and 0 if not (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995)
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. The studies show that democracy affects 
rights only at very high levels (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004). Thus, we take the polity 
IV scores to capture for democracy levels. Following other prominent studies in literature 
(Goldstone 1991; Henderson, 1993; Homer-Dixon et al. 1993; Poe, Tate, 1994; Howard 
& Homer-Dixon 1995; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; Blanton, 1999; Blanton & Blanton, 
2007; Eriksen & de Soysa 2008; Vadlamannati & Tamazian, 2007 and Vadlamannati & 
de Soysa 2008) we also take into account the log value of total population adapted from 
world development indicators of World Bank 2006. The countries with higher ethnic 
fractionalization often face the risk of ethnic wars. To capture this effect, we include the 
degree of ethnic fractionalization developed by Fearon & Laitin (2003). Prominent 
studies like Poe and Tate (1994); Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) and Dreher, Gassebner & 
Siemers (2007) argue that civil war and peace years are important determinants of human 
rights conditions. Thus, we include the dummy variable 1 if civil war exists in the 
country and 0 otherwise. We also include number of peace years for each country from 
1993 to 2006. The peace years variable is included as the number of peace years since 
every last civil war occurred in a country. The data for both these variables come from 
the Uppsala database updated version of 2007. Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & 
Keith (1999) argue that countries with British legal system are associated with lower 
human rights abuses to Socialistic legal system. This would be even more interesting in 
the context of transition economies as majority of these countries belong to former Soviet 
Union. We give the value 1 if the country has socialist legal system and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we include the ratio of the reforms period and years under communism to reflect 
the initial conditions of reforms process in transition economies. The data for these ratios 
are partly adapted from Chousa et al. (2005) till 2000 and data for later years is 
constructed by the author. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistics & Bivariate Plots 
 
The sample of country-years that we examine in total made up of 364 observations. In 
annexure 3, we present the summary statistics for this sample for all the variables that we 
employ in the regression analysis. The mean value for PIR is 8.00 per country-year with a 
small standard deviation of 1.83. The sample is also made up of another human rights 
indicator namely, ER index. The mean value of this is 7.00 with slightly higher standard 
deviation compared to PRI, 2.90. Infact compared to rest of the variables, the standard 
deviation of both these variables are large. Regarding the economic reforms we can find 
that the median value is 2.59, but the variance in reforms is very low, with a standard 
deviation of just 0.69. Economic reforms ranges from 1 to 3.90, 1 being no reforms 
initiation by the country. Similarly, Speed of reforms range from 0.00 to 0.15 which 
means from absolutely halt of reforms initiation to very high speed.  The mean value is 
0.08 with a very small variation of 0.03.  
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 The data can be accessed from http://www.colorado.edu/ IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html. 
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In graphs 1 to 4 (see annexures) we capture the human rights conditions of PIR and ER 
during early and late transition years. We find in graph 1 that PIR have considerably 
dipped below the score of 5 during the early transition years. Post 1995 the PIR 
conditions slowly started to increase. In graph 2 we can see that PIR conditions became 
fairly consistent with marginal fluctuations during later years of transition. Similar such 
trend can be observed for ER index.  In graph 3 we see that the ER index coming down 
drastically during the early years of transition. The ER index remained low almost till 
2000. Post 2000 the index improved significantly, but witnessed lot of fluctuations. This 
is due to adjustments in labour market as ER index includes substantial chunk of 
indicators related to workers‟ rights including that of women.  
 
4. 2. Regression Estimates 
 
The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of speed and choice of reforms 
on Human rights performance viz., physical integrity rights and empowerment rights in 
transition economies are presented in tables 1 to 5 with various permutations and 
combinations of hypothesis variables. We control for Heteroskedasticity using White 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. In models 1 and 3 (table 1) 
we find that economic reforms has 1% significant positive impact on both forms of 
human rights conditions. The Physical Integrity Rights (PIR hereafter) scores suggest that 
on a scale of 0 to 9, zero represent worst human rights abuses and 9 highest represent 
respect for human rights, while the Empowerment Rights (ER henceforth) scores suggest 
that on a scale of 0 to 10, zero represent worst human rights abuses and 10 represent 
respect for human rights. Therefore the positive effect of economic reforms on both 
suggests a reduction in human rights abuses. For every 1% increase in economic reforms 
index leads to 0.59% and 1.59% increase in government respect for both forms of human 
rights respectively. In other words, holding at its mean value, increase in economic 
reforms index by its highest value (3.90 points) would increase the respect for PIR by 
0.59% and ER by 1.59%. The interesting finding however is the curvi linear effect of 
economic reforms. We find negative effect of current level of economic reforms, while 
accelerating the economic reforms process has a positive effect on PIR (model 2; table 1), 
while the same cannot be found for ER. However, though this relationship is week with 
15% confidence level, it confirms the inverted U-shaped relationship between the two. 
 
Table 1: Economic Reforms & Human Rights equation function 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
Model 2 
 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
Model 3 
 
Empowerment 
Rights 
Model 4 
 
Empowerment 
Rights 
 
Constant 
3.65 * 
(1.33) 
5.32 * 
(1.97) 
12.22 *  
(1.82) 
12.79 * 
(2.42) 
Economic Reforms 
0.59 * 
(0.17) 
-0.39 
(0.73) 
1.59 * 
(0.21) 
1.25 + 
(0.89) 
Economic Reforms Squared 
----- 0.20 + 
(0.14) 
----- 0.07 
(0.18) 
Economic Growth Rate -0.02 *** -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
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(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.67 * 
(0.13) 
0.58  
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
Log (Population) 
-0.30 * 
(0.06) 
-0.28 * 
(0.06) 
-0.57 * 
(0.08) 
-0.56 * 
(0.09) 
Democracy 
0.05 * 
(0.02) 
0.06 * 
(0.02) 
0.16 * 
(0.02) 
0.16 * 
(0.02) 
1/3rd Oil Exports 
0.23 
(0.22) 
0.25 
(0.22) 
0.19 
(0.26) 
0.20 
(0.26) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
0.53 
(0.42) 
0.53 
(0.41) 
1.87 * 
(0.70) 
1.88 * 
(0.70) 
British / Socialist Legal System 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
-1.91 * 
(0.24) 
-1.94 * 
(0.25) 
Civil War 
-2.74 * 
(0.28) 
-2.74 * 
(0.28) 
0.04 
(0.33) 
0.04 
(0.33) 
Civil Peace Years 
0.01 + 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04 * 
(0.01) 
0.04 * 
(0.01) 
Time dummy 
-0.11 * 
(0.02) 
-0.12 * 
(0.02) 
-0.24 * 
(0.02) 
-0.24 * 
(0.03) 
R-squared 0.633151 0.635498 0.757401 0.757511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.621654 0.623000 0.749798 0.749197 
S.E. of regression 1.128527 1.126518 1.451310 1.453052 
Log likelihood -552.8648 -551.7001 -644.1786 -644.0962 
F-statistic 55.07245 50.85108 99.62102 91.11368 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 
Number of Observations 364 364 364 364 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
We see positive relationship between development and both forms of human rights 
suggesting that improvement in quality of life through higher development process help 
reduce economic insecurity thereby reducing social tensions and unrests in the society. 
However, the findings of economic growth rate show contrary results. The negative 
impact of GDP growth rate on all forms of human rights supports the view that growth 
would increase state repression because it leads to instability as the rebellion increases. 
We find that an increase in population levels exerts pressure on human rights abuses. 
This effect is consistent across all forms of human rights displayed in all models. The 
results related to ethnic fractionalization are mixed. Surprisingly we find positive sign but 
are only significant for ER (see models 3 & 4; table 1).  
 
The other most significant finding of the study is the effect of transition to democracy 
from communist period. We find that an improvement in democracy levels is associated 
with higher government respect in both the cases. The results are robust across the board. 
When we introduce civil war year dummy, we find a 1% significant negative relationship 
with PIR, while it remained insignificant for ER. On the contrary the number of peace 
years is helping reduce human rights abuses. But the statistical significance for this 
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variable is week for PIR. The coefficient value for civil war dummy is higher than peace 
years, suggesting that the risk of civil war is always detrimental to human rights 
conditions. The results could not demonstrate the negative impact of oil exports on 
human rights abuses. This is because, except three countries (Russia, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan) all other economies are oil importers. While consistent with the results of 
prominent studies Poe & Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) we find significant 
negative impact of both population pressures and socialist legal heritage on all forms of 
human rights. All these results of control variables are statistically significant and 
consistent across all the models.  
 
Table 2: Speed of Reforms & Physical Integrity Rights equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Rights Index 
 
Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
 
 
Constant 
2.90  
(1.87) 
2.74  
(1.93) 
4.19 ** 
(1.78) 
3.49 ** 
(1.79) 
2.91 *** 
(1.88) 
3.12 *** 
(1.81) 
0.007 
(2.09) 
Speed of Reforms 
6.86 *** 
(3.76) 
10.01 
(8.92) 
----- ----- 10.30 * 
(3.75) 
----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms Squared 
----- -23.72 
(54.83) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Volatility in Reforms Process 
----- ----- -1.03 + 
(0.70) 
----- -1.67 ** 
(0.69) 
----- ----- 
Variance in Speed of Reforms 
----- ----- ----- 6.41 *** 
(3.68) 
----- ----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms X Reforms 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 2.61 ** 
(1.02) 
----- 
Cumulative Economic Reforms   
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 1.59 * 
(0.45) 
Economic Growth 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.82  * 
(0.11) 
0.85 * 
(0.12) 
0.85 * 
(0.11) 
0.85 * 
(0.11) 
0.83 * 
(0.11) 
0.73 * 
(0.12) 
0.75 * 
(0.11) 
Log (Population) 
-0.28 * 
(0.06) 
-0.29 * 
(0.07) 
-0.28 * 
(0.06) 
-0.30 * 
(0.06) 
-0.25 * 
(0.06) 
-0.25 * 
(0.06) 
-0.32 * 
(0.06) 
Democracy 
0.06 * 
(0.02) 
0.06 * 
(0.02) 
0.08 * 
(0.01) 
0.07 * 
(0.01) 
0.06 * 
(0.01) 
0.05 * 
(0.01) 
0.06 * 
(0.01) 
Oil Exports 
0.12 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.22) 
0.14 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.22) 
0.11 
(0.22) 
0.13 
(0.22) 
0.19 
(0.22) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  
0.59 
(0.43) 
0.62 
(0.44) 
0.89 ** 
(0.41) 
0.66 *** 
(0.42) 
0.56 
(0.41) 
0.47 
(0.43) 
0.40 
(0.43) 
Socialist Legal System 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
-0.21 
(0.22) 
-0.002 
(0.15) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.31 *** 
(0.19) 
-0.35 *** 
(0.20) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
Civil War 
-2.72 * 
(0.28) 
-2.71 * 
(0.28) 
-2.73 * 
(0.28) 
-2.74 * 
(0.28) 
-2.79 * 
(0.28) 
-2.75 * 
(0.28) 
-2.82 * 
(0.29) 
Peace Years 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.006 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.005  
 21 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time 
-0.11 * 
(0.03) 
-0.10 * 
(0.03) 
-0.15 * 
(0.04) 
-0.09 * 
(0.03) 
-0.16 * 
(0.03) 
-0.10 * 
(0.03) 
-0.22 * 
(0.04) 
Log (Reforms Years/ Communist 
Years) 
-0.04 
(0.39) 
-0.05 
(0.40) 
0.40 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.36) 
-0.13 
(0.39) 
-0.21  
(0.41) 
-0.50 
(0.41) 
 
R-squared 0.625025 0.625172 0.623996 0.624085 0.632467 0.627859 0.634995 
Adjusted R-squared 0.612168 0.611209 0.611105 0.611196 0.618777 0.615100 0.622481 
S.E. of regression 1.142587 1.143998 1.144153 1.144018 1.132810 1.138261 1.127294 
Log likelihood -556.8414 -556.7703 -557.3386 -557.2957 -553.2027 -555.4645 -551.9501 
F-statistic 48.61623 44.77636 48.40346 48.42178 46.19811 49.20857 50.74092 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Total number of Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Having found significant positive relationship between economic reforms and human 
rights conditions in the first place, we now explore the relationship between the speed of 
reforms and human rights performance. To this end, we present the results of the same in 
table 2 and 3. In model 5 (see table 2) we find that speed of reforms significantly improve 
government respect for PIR. The largest value of speed of reforms (0.15 points) would 
raise PIR by 6.86%, which is around 85% of the mean value of PIR. In model 6 (table 2), 
we test for curvi linear relationship between the two. Though we find that current level of 
speed of reforms has positive effect and acceleration of speed of reforms having negative 
effect on PIR, there is no statistical significance for both. But the interesting finding 
which emerges from this model is that while for economic reforms and human rights, 
there exists a perfect U-shaped relationship. But the same is not true in the case of speed 
of reforms and human rights. On the contrary, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
This suggests that speed is good, but further acceleration from current level of speed may 
have a detrimental effect on human rights conditions.  
 
The volatility in economic reforms leads to uncertainty and thereby increases human 
rights abuses. For every single percentage increase in volatility in economic reforms is 
associated with 1.03% decline in human rights conditions. Using the residual method to 
has almost the same effect as our standard measure of speed of reforms. For every 1% 
variation in speed of reforms leads to 6.41% increase in respect for human rights (see 
model 8, table 2). The residuals are captured by regressing EBRD‟s economic reforms 
index on potential determinants as discussed in previous section. The results of this 
model are presented in annexure 4. In model 9, we introduce both speed of reforms and 
volatility in economic reforms together. We find that while speed of reforms holds on 
with 1% significance and positive sign, volatility in reforms exert negative association 
with 5% significance level. This suggests that while speed of reforms help improve 
human rights conditions, at the same time, any uncertainty in reforms process is harmful 
for the human rights conditions. In model 10 (table 2) we introduce the interactive effect 
between economic reforms and speed of reforms only to find 1% significant positive 
relationship with human rights conditions. If we compare these results with that of model 
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1 (see table 1) the coefficient value of economic reforms when interacted with speed of 
reforms increased significantly. While economic reforms alone leads to 0.59% increase in 
PIR (see model 1; table 1), but the same conditioned by speed of reforms leads to 2.61% 
increase in PIR, which is an increases of 2.01% in coefficient value from model 1 to 
model 10. This means that the greater impact of economic reforms on human rights is 
conditioned by speed at which reforms are carried. To cross check our results, we 
introduced cumulative reforms index in model 11. We find that maximum value of 
cumulative reforms index associates with increase in PIR by 1.59% with 1% significance. 
This suggests that results are robust. The only variable whose results are not consistent 
across the models is initial conditions. This is neither significant nor consistent with its 
signs, suggesting that the initial conditions do not matter for human rights performance.  
 
Table 3: Speed of Reforms & Empowerment Rights equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Empowerment Rights Index 
 
Variables Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
 
 
Constant 
11.58 * 
(2.18) 
10.91 * 
(2.30) 
14.28 * 
(2.32) 
12.74 * 
(2.11) 
11.59 * 
(2.17) 
12.50 * 
(2.11) 
6.10 ** 
(2.50) 
Speed of Reforms 
19.72 * 
(4.56) 
33.17 * 
(11.84) 
----- ----- 21.79 * 
(4.84) 
----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms Squared 
----- -101.41 
(81.18) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Volatility in Reforms Process 
----- ----- -0.33 
(0.75) 
----- -1.01 
(0.79) 
----- ----- 
Variance in Speed of Reforms 
----- ----- ----- 27.07 * 
(4.86) 
----- ----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms X Reforms 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 6.56 * 
(1.35) 
----- 
Cumulative Economic Reforms   
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 3.40 * 
(0.59) 
Economic Growth 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.02 *** 
(0.01) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.40 * 
(0.13) 
0.51 * 
(0.16) 
0.43 * 
(0.14) 
0.48 * 
(0.13) 
0.40 * 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.26 *** 
(0.14) 
Log (Population) 
-0.50 * 
(0.08) 
-0.55 * 
(0.09) 
-0.54 * 
(0.09) 
-0.59 * 
(0.08) 
-0.49 * 
(0.08) 
-0.46 * 
(0.08) 
-0.60 * 
(0.08) 
Democracy 
0.17 * 
(0.01) 
0.17 * 
(0.02) 
0.21 * 
(0.02) 
0.22 * 
(0.01) 
0.17 * 
(0.01) 
0.17 * 
(0.01) 
0.18 * 
(0.01) 
Oil Exports 
-0.03 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
(0.28) 
0.03 
(0.32) 
-0.05 
(0.27) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.13  
(0.28) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  
2.08 * 
(0.73) 
2.19 * 
(0.75) 
2.75 * 
(0.66) 
2.04 * 
(0.75) 
2.06 * 
(0.74) 
1.85 ** 
(0.77) 
1.85 ** 
(0.73) 
Socialist Legal System 
-2.43 * 
(0.28) 
-2.20 * 
(0.33) 
-1.81 * 
(0.25) 
-2.13 * 
(0.25) 
-2.45 * 
(0.28) 
-2.55 * 
(0.28) 
-1.52 * 
(0.23) 
Civil War 0.12 0.16 0.21 -0.002 0.08 0.04 -0.08 
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(0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.36) 
Peace Years 
0.05 * 
(0.00) 
0.05 * 
(0.00) 
0.04 * 
(0.00) 
0.04 * 
(0.00) 
0.05 * 
(0.00) 
0.05 * 
(0.00) 
0.03 * 
(0.00) 
Time 
-0.26 * 
(0.04) 
-0.26 * 
(0.05) 
-0.26 * 
(0.05) 
-0.18 * 
(0.05) 
-0.30 * 
(0.05) 
-0.26 * 
(0.04) 
-0.52 * 
(0.05) 
Log (Reforms Years/ Communist 
Years) 
0.29 
(0.53) 
0.28 
(0.53) 
1.36 * 
(0.47) 
0.24 
(0.52) 
0.24 
(0.53) 
0.004 
(0.55) 
0.40  
(0.56) 
 
R-squared 0.738304 0.739378 0.724235 0.748073 0.739383 0.742076 0.750273 
Adjusted R-squared 0.729332 0.729670 0.714781 0.739435 0.729675 0.733232 0.741711 
S.E. of regression 1.509501 1.508558 1.549545 1.481059 1.508543 1.498584 1.474577 
Log likelihood -657.9312 -657.1851 -667.4355 -651.0264 -657.1814 -655.2965 -649.4341 
F-statistic 82.28592 76.16176 76.59983 86.60757 76.16387 83.91557 87.62776 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Total number of Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
In table 3 we enter ER as dependent variable covering models from 12 to 18. The 1% 
significant positive sign of speed of reforms suggest that increase in speed help reduce 
the ER abuses. Holding at its mean value, increase in speed of reforms by its highest 
value (0.15 points) would increase government respect for ER by 19.72% (see model 12). 
The curvilinear relationship between the two show similar results as it did in earlier 
models for PIR. But this time, we see 1% statistical significance for current level of speed 
of reforms. This suggests that even for ER, which extends much beyond state terrorism 
and includes civil and political rights, acceleration of speed of reforms from current level 
would prove detrimental (see model 13). While volatility in economic reforms could not 
find any statistical significance despite its negative sign, variation in speed of reforms is 
associated with 27.07% increase in ER with statistical significance of 1% (model 14 & 
15). When introduced together, volatility in reforms still remains statistically 
insignificant, but the positive effect of speed of reforms with 1% significance remains 
intact. This suggests that though speed of reforms matters for ER, the importance of 
volatility in reforms is nullified. The interesting finding of these results include model 17, 
where we find that the interactive effect of speed of reforms and economic reforms lead 
to 6.56% increase in ER with 1% significance level. The Economic reforms alone leads 
to 1.59% increase in ER (see model 3; table 1), but the same conditioned by speed of 
reforms leads to 6.56% increase in PIR, which is an increases of 5.03% in coefficient 
value in model 17 to model 3. In the last model 18, we capture the cumulative reforms 
index which replaces our standard method of speed of reforms. We find that for every 1% 
increase in cumulative reforms index is associated with 3.40% increase in ER conditions. 
This once again reiterates that the results are robust in nature. Even in these models, we 
could not find any statistical significance for initial conditions, but the sign remained 
positive and consistent.  
 
While in both the tables (2 & 3), we tested for the relationship between speed of reforms 
and PIR; ER and found significant positive associations between the two, the results were 
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for full sample period from 1993 to 2006, which includes early transition years also. 
Since almost all the countries have witnessed painful conditions during the early 
transition years which were marked by violence, riots and state suppression, it would be 
interesting to test the same for early transition years. We ran same results taking into 
account first five years from 1993 to 1997 of our sample. The results are displayed in 
annexure 5. Model 31 and 32 include dependent variables, PIR and ER. In both models 
we find that though speed of reforms is positive, it remains statistically insignificant. 
Also the initial conditions in both the models show negative signs, but are insignificant. 
The baseline models (model 5 and 12) presented in tables 2 and 3 enables us to compare 
trends in speed of reforms between full sample of transition years and early transition 
periods. It also help identify the extent to which alternative estimation methods and 
different sample characteristics systematically affect estimates of the basic human rights 
conditions. Thus, the results suggests that speed of reforms did not matter during the 
early transition years, but have had a significant effect in improving human rights 
performance during the later years of transition. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Heybey & Murell (1997); Fischer et al. (1996); Wolf (1999) and Berg el al. 
(1999) who found that speed of reforms benefits socioeconomic conditions in long run.  
 
Table 4: Choice & Speed of Reforms & Physical Integrity Rights equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Rights Index 
 
Variables 
 
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
 
 
Constant 
2.95 *** 
(1.87) 
3.00 *** 
(1.90) 
3.45 *** 
(1.93) 
3.95 ** 
(1.78) 
3.59 ** 
(1.81) 
4.13 ** 
(1.81) 
Speed of Reforms 
6.73 *** 
(3.78) 
4.20 
(3.74) 
4.88 
(3.64) 
----- ----- ----- 
Gradual Reformers 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Radical Reformers 
----- 0.71 * 
(0.15) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
 Laggard Reformers 
----- ----- -0.67 * 
(0.17) 
----- ----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms X Gradual 
Reformers 
----- ----- ----- -1.40 
(1.33) 
----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms X Radical 
Reformers 
----- ----- ----- ----- 6.95 * 
(1.41) 
----- 
Speed of Reforms X Laggard 
Reformers 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -5.65 * 
(1.86) 
Economic Growth 
-0.02  
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.84 * 
(0.11) 
0.69 * 
(0.12) 
0.64 * 
(0.12) 
0.84 * 
(0.11) 
0.68 * 
(0.12) 
0.68 * 
(0.12) 
Log (Population) 
-0.28 * 
(0.06) 
-0.26 * 
(0.06) 
-0.24 * 
(0.06) 
-0.29 * 
(0.06) 
-0.24 * 
(0.06) 
-0.25 * 
(0.06) 
Democracy 0.06 * 0.07 * 0.06 * 0.07 * 0.07 * 0.09 * 
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(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Oil Exports 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.29  
(0.22) 
0.39 *** 
(0.23) 
0.12 
(0.22) 
0.29 
(0.22) 
0.35 + 
(0.23) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  
0.66 
(0.44) 
0.45 
(0.43) 
0.18 
(0.45) 
0.88 ** 
(0.43) 
0.54 
(0.42) 
0.59 
(0.43) 
Socialist Legal System 
-0.28 
(0.20) 
-0.28 
(0.20) 
-0.23 
(0.19) 
-0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.23 + 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
Civil War 
-2.70 * 
(0.27) 
-2.72 * 
(0.27) 
-2.78 * 
(0.28) 
-2.68 * 
(0.27) 
-2.74 * 
(0.27) 
-2.74 * 
(0.28) 
Peace Years 
0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.01 *** 
(0.00) 
0.006 + 
(0.00) 
0.005  
(0.00) 
0.005  
(0.00) 
Time 
-0.11 * 
(0.03) 
-0.06 *** 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.11 * 
(0.03) 
-0.08 ** 
(0.03) 
-0.07 *** 
(0.04) 
Log (Reforms Years/ Communist 
Years) 
-0.007 
(0.40) 
-0.32 
(0.40) 
-0.45 
(0.42) 
0.39 
(0.35) 
-0.06 
(0.36) 
0.10 
(0.37) 
 
R-squared 0.625902 0.646274 0.641528 0.621239 0.639173 0.630065 
Adjusted R-squared 0.611967 0.633098 0.628175 0.608253 0.626802 0.617381 
S.E. of regression 1.142883 1.111328 1.118760 1.148339 1.120823 1.134882 
Log likelihood -556.4163 -546.2529 -548.6723 -558.6645 -549.8605 -554.3854 
F-statistic 44.91621 49.04927 48.04433 47.83885 51.66621 49.67595 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Total number of Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
In the earlier models we have found that both economic reforms and speed of reforms are 
associated with better human rights conditions in transition economies. This brings us to 
our third question, the choice of reforms. Along with speed of reforms, in models 19 to 
21 we introduce three other variables namely, radical, gradual and laggard reformers as 
hypothesis variables. In model 19 we include gradual reformers along with speed of 
reforms. We find that speed of reforms has 10% significant and positive association with 
PIR. While gradual reforming countries bears a negative sign and is insignificance. In 
model 20, we find that radical reforming countries have a 1% significant positive impact 
on PIR, while laggards in model 21 have 1% significance but with negative sign. The 
interesting trend which emerges from these results is that radical reforming countries 
have better human rights conditions to others. Even interms of coefficient values, the 
radical reforming countries with 0.71% is highest in comparison to the rest. Meaning, for 
every single increase of countries under radical reformers category is associated with 
0.71% increase in government rest for PIR.  
 
Having found the association of radical reforming countries with better human rights 
conditions, we probe our next question which is to see whether the positive impact of 
speed of reforms is conditioned by which type of reforming strategy? To answer this, in 
the next three models (22 to 24) we introduce interactive effects between the three and 
speed of reforms. The results show that while speed of reforms under gradual and laggard 
 26 
reforming countries has negative effect on PIR performance, it shows positive effect for 
radicals. Even here, the coefficient value of radical reformers is higher than the other two 
(see models 22, 23 and 24; table 4). This suggests that positive effect of speed of reforms 
on PIR is conditioned only by radical reforming countries. This also means that the speed 
of reforms under graduals is slow and do not matter for PIR performance. But, the effect 
of speed of reforms on PIR conditioned by laggards is not only negative but also 
significant at 1% confidence level. This suggests that though gradual reforms might not 
matter much for PIR conditions but no reforms scenario (that of laggards) is detrimental 
to basic human rights conditions.  
 
Table 5: Choice & Speed of Reforms & Empowerment Rights equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Empowerment Rights Index 
 
Variables Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
 
 
Constant 
11.66 * 
(2.19) 
11.76 * 
(2.18) 
12.63 * 
(2.21) 
14.75 * 
(2.31) 
13.76 * 
(2.18) 
14.75 * 
(2.29) 
Speed of Reforms 
19.52 * 
(4.60) 
14.88 * 
(4.60) 
16.01 * 
(4.46) 
----- ----- ----- 
Gradual Reformers 
-0.26 
(0.21) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Radical Reformers 
----- 1.30 * 
(0.21) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
 Laggard Reformers 
----- ----- -1.26 * 
(0.23) 
----- ----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms X Gradual 
Reformers 
----- ----- ----- -6.27 * 
(2.22) 
----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms X Radical 
Reformers 
----- ----- ----- ----- 15.32 * 
(2.13) 
----- 
Speed of Reforms X Laggard 
Reformers 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -8.11 * 
(2.73) 
Economic Growth 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.42 ** 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.14) 
0.48 * 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
Log (Population) 
-0.51 * 
(0.08) 
-0.48 * 
(0.08) 
-0.45 * 
(0.08) 
-0.55 * 
(0.08) 
-0.43 * 
(0.08) 
-0.48 * 
(0.08) 
Democracy 
0.17 * 
(0.02) 
0.19 * 
(0.02) 
0.19 * 
(0.02) 
0.22 * 
(0.01) 
0.22 * 
(0.01) 
0.24 * 
(0.01) 
Oil Exports 
-0.08 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.28) 
0.48 *** 
(0.29) 
-0.04 
(0.33) 
0.36 
(0.31) 
0.33  
(0.35) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  
2.18 * 
(0.73) 
1.82 ** 
(0.71) 
1.32 *** 
(0.73) 
3.00 * 
(0.66) 
2.13 * 
(0.68) 
2.42 * 
(0.70) 
Socialist Legal System 
-2.45 * 
(0.28) 
-2.46 * 
(0.28) 
-2.36 * 
(0.27) 
-1.73 * 
(0.24) 
-2.22 * 
(0.25) 
-1.84 * 
(0.25) 
Civil War 0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.22 0.08  0.13 
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(0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) 
Peace Years 
0.05 * 
(0.00) 
0.04 * 
(0.00) 
0.05 * 
(0.00) 
0.04 * 
(0.00) 
0.04 * 
(0.00) 
0.04 * 
(0.00) 
Time 
-0.27 * 
(0.05) 
-0.18 * 
(0.05) 
-0.16 * 
(0.05) 
-0.30 * 
(0.05) 
-0.21 * 
(0.05) 
-0.22 * 
(0.05) 
Log (Reforms Years/ Communist 
Years) 
0.35 
(0.54) 
-0.22 
(0.54) 
-0.47 
(0.54) 
1.63 * 
(0.49) 
0.51 
(0.47) 
1.04 ** 
(0.49) 
 
R-squared 0.739123 0.766343 0.761570 0.728264 0.759895 0.731824 
Adjusted R-squared 0.729406 0.757640 0.752688 0.718947 0.751663 0.722629 
S.E. of regression 1.509295 1.428385 1.442903 1.538186 1.445892 1.528077 
Log likelihood -657.3623 -637.3618 -641.0325 -664.7647 -642.3031 -662.3712 
F-statistic 76.06125 88.04961 85.74925 78.16772 92.30782 79.59255 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Total number of Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
In models 25 to 30 presented in table 5 we replace PIR with ER as dependent variable. 
We find almost similar results repeating here with some changes in significance levels. In 
model 25, we find gradual reforming countries have negative effect on ER, but this 
relationship remains insignificant. The radical reforming countries are associated with 
better ER performance, while laggards have negative effect on the same. Both these 
variables share 1% statistical significance. The coefficient value of radical reformers is 
higher than the other two. In model 28 and 30 (table 5), we find that the interactive effect 
between speed of reforms; graduals and laggards has 1% significant negative impact on 
ER conditions. While the model 29 shows that the interactive effect between speed of 
reforms and radical reformers show 1% significant positive impact. This reiterates the 
earlier findings that the positive effect of speed of reforms on ER conditions is 
conditioned only by radical reforming countries. While the slow pace of reforms or no 
reforms scenario found amongst gradual and laggards do no good for ER conditions.  
 
4. 3. Robustness Check 
 
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran all the results again by dividing the total 
sample group into two. One set includes CIS along with Baltic countries. The second set 
includes East & Central European countries alone. We do not find any significant 
changes in both the results. The second such test includes running all the base models 
using lagged values of all the independent variables. We could not find any major 
significant changes in the results
14
. Next we test our models by replacing both PIR and 
ER indicators with freedom house scores. We compute the average of civil liberties and 
political freedom scores, which is our dependent variable. These scores are ranked 
between 1 and 7, with 1 suggesting lower or no rights and 7 being full liberties. For 
convince of interpretation, we inverse the scores. The results are displayed in annexure 6. 
                                                 
14
 Both the results are not shown here due to space constraints. They will be provided upon request 
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The estimates show that speed of reforms lead to increase in government respect for civil 
and political rights. The coefficient value is much higher than that of PIR and ER indices. 
But, we failed to find curvi linear effect relationship for this model. The interactive effect 
between speed of reforms and economic reforms shows 1% significant and positive 
impact on civil and political rights. This once again reiterates that the greater impact of 
economic reforms on human rights is conditioned by speed of reforms. Finally, the 
cumulative reforms index holds on with 1% significant positive impact to highlight the 
robustness of the results. 
 
5. Summary & Conclusion 
 
Having found significant positive impact of economic reforms on human rights in 
transition economies by Vadlamannati & Soysa (2008), this paper focuses on the 
implications of speed and choice of reforms on human rights performance. There are 
divergent views on the impact of speed of reforms effecting socioeconomic conditions. 
The Anglo-Saxon perspective argues that speed of reforms lead to growth and 
development which inturn generates respect for human rights. While skeptics contend 
that rushing towards a free market economy would always be destructive as development 
process tends to be exclusive creating exogenous shocks leading to social and economic 
unrest. This leads to domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to resort to 
repressive measures. Taking both the arguments into account, we try to find whether 
speed and choice of reforms increase or decrease government respect for human rights in 
transition economies. 
 
EBDR‟s economic reforms index was used to construct speed of reforms variable by 
subtracting economic reforms index in the current year with initial level of economic 
reforms in 1990 and dividing the derived value with number of transition/reforms years. 
On the other hand, CIRI‟s Physical Integrity Rights, proxy for state terrorism and 
Empowerment Rights, proxy for civil and political rights represented Human rights 
conditions. Using pooled regression analysis for the period 1993 – 2006 for 26 transition 
economies, our results find significant positive effect of speed of reforms on human 
rights performance. Replacing our method of speed of reforms with residual and 
cumulative reforms index methods, the results do not change significantly. Volatility in 
economic reforms is used as proxy for structural policy uncertainty leading to economic 
insecurity and social unrest. We find very strong negative effect of volatility in reforms 
on human rights conditions.  
 
In the next phase of the study we study the relationship between choice of reforms and 
human rights performance. Using the methodology of Wolf (1999) we divided the 26 
transition economies under three major categories viz., radicals, graduals and laggards 
reformers. Increase in EBDR‟s economic reforms index by 1 in any consecutive two 
years with final score of 3 at the end of sample period and above was classified as radical 
reforming country. Similarly, countries obtaining final score of 3 and above but failed to 
increase index value by 1 and above during any two consecutive years were labeled as 
gradual reformers. Failing to meet any of the two criteria was termed as laggards.  After 
controlling for the speed of reforms, we found that the choice with which the country has 
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reformed plays pivotal role in determining human rights performance. While radical 
reforming countries have better human rights performance, it is exactly opposite in the 
case of gradualists and laggards. We also measured the impact of speed of reforms on 
human rights performance conditioned by choice of reforms. We find that the positive 
effect of speed of reforms is conditioned by only radical reforming countries and not by 
gradual and laggards reformers. Meaning, countries which adopt radical reforms 
experience faster economic reforms and there by better human rights performance, while 
this is not the case with countries following gradual reforms and countries with no 
reforms process.      
 
Where do we go from here? 
 
While we have focused on the most contentious topic in political economy, the linkage 
between not only economic reforms, but speed of reforms and human rights taking the 
case of transition economies, our study suggests avenues for further research on this most 
interesting topic. Future empirical work might focus on finding out the existence of 
inverse domino effect of economic reforms on host country‟s reforms process which 
inturn affect human rights in the first place. In doing so, the research has to identify the 
important channels through which reforms are transmitted from countries to another 
country. If there is any contagious effect it would be imperative to measure its impact on 
human rights. If found any impact, in the next stage it would be interesting to see 
likewise economic reforms, is speed of reforms also contagious? If so, then what would 
be its impact on human rights performance of respective countries. 
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Annexures 
 
 
Annexure 1: Transition economies under study 
 
Armenia Azerbaijan Albania Belarus Bulgaria Croatia 
Czech Republic Estonia Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia Lithuania Moldova Mongolia Macedonia Poland 
Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia Tajikistan Turkmenistan 
Ukraine Uzbekistan ----- ----- ----- ----- 
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Annexure 2: Classification of transition economies according to choice of reforms adoption 
 
 
Countries 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Armenia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Azerbaijan L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Albania R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Belarus L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Bulgaria L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Croatia G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 
Czech Republic R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Estonia R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Georgia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Hungary R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Kazakhstan L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Kyrgyz Republic R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Latvia G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 
Lithuania R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Moldova L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Mongolia G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 
Macedonia G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 
Poland R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Romania G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 
Russia L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Slovakia R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Slovenia G G G G G G G G G G G G G G 
Tajikistan L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Turkmenistan L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Ukraine L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Uzbekistan L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Note: L = Laggards; G = Gradualists & R = Radical reformers 
 
 
 
 
Annexure – 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables 
 
Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std. Dev. Sum Sq. Dev. 
Economic Reforms 3.90 1.00 2.54 2.59 0.69 170.90 
Economic Reforms Squared 15.21 1.00 6.94 6.71 3.45 4317.48 
Speed of Reforms  0.15 0.00 0.08  0.08  0.03 0.40 
Reform years / communist years  0.44 0.07  0.21 0.20  0.09 2.87 
Gradualist Reforms Countries 1.00  0.00 0.15 0.00  0.36  47.38 
Radical Reforms Countries 1.00  0.00  0.31  0.00  0.46 77.54 
Laggard Reforms Countries 1.00  0.00 0.54  1.00  0.50 90.46 
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Gradualist Reforms Countries X Speed 
of Reforms 
 0.14  0.00  0.01 0.00  0.03 0.41 
Radical Reforms Countries X Speed of 
Reforms 
 0.15  0.00 0.03  0.00  0.04  0.70 
Laggard Reforms Countries X Speed 
of Reforms 
 0.04  0.02  0.12 0.00  0.04  0.62 
Personal Integrity Rights 8.00 0.00 5.48 6.00 1.83 1218.50 
Empowerment Rights 10.00 0.00 6.29 7.00 2.90 3047.50 
GDP Growth Rate 34.50 -30.90 3.29 4.49 7.61 20982.30 
Percapita GDP 23603.56 708.1 6516.31 5894.13 4680.3 0.007 
Population 149000000 1342300 15288289 5324600 28626537 0.002 
Democracy 10.00 -9.00 3.83 7.00 6.51 15344.07 
Oil Export Dummy 1.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.36 47.36 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.69 0.03 0.38 0.40 0.18 11.80 
Socialist Legal System 1.00 0.00 0.81 1.00 0.39 55.88 
Civil War Dummy 1.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.27 26.68 
Civil Peace Years 60.00 0.00 15.55 8.00 19.10 132004 
 
 
Annexure 4: Speed of Reforms – Initial Conditions equation function 
 
Variables Model 31 
(Speed of Reforms) 
Constant 
0.09 * 
(0.00) 
Economic growth rate 
0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.005 ** 
(0.00) 
Initial Conditions 
-0.04 * 
(0.00) 
Political Freedom 
-0.01 * 
(0.00) 
Time 
0.004 * 
(0.00) 
 
R-squared 0.677101 
Adjusted R-squared 0.672592 
S.E. of regression 0.019019 
Log likelihood 928.8124 
F-statistic 150.1414 
Number of countries 26 
Total number of Observations 364 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Annexure 5: Speed of Reforms & Human rights in early transition years‟ equation function 
 
Variables Model 32 
(Physical Integrity Rights Index) 
Model 33 
(Empowerment Rights Index) 
 
Constant 
1.27 
(3.84) 
5.21 
(3.51) 
Speed of Reforms 
12.01 
(8.20) 
8.45 
(8.92) 
Economic Growth 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.94 * 
(0.27) 
0.83 * 
(0.28) 
Log (Population) 
-0.33 
(0.12) 
-0.42 * 
(0.14) 
Democracy 
0.05 *** 
(0.03) 
0.15 * 
(0.02) 
Oil Exports 
0.58 
(0.44) 
-0.70 *** 
(0.45) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  
-0.45 
(0.85) 
2.80 ** 
(1.36) 
Socialist Legal System 
-0.21 
(0.41) 
-1.91 * 
(0.50) 
Civil War 
-3.33 * 
(0.42) 
0.35 
(0.41) 
Peace Years 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04 * 
(0.01) 
Log (Reforms Years/ Communist 
Years) 
-0.88 
(0.78) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
Time 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.41  
(0.84) 
 
R-squared 0.589648 0.695568 
Adjusted R-squared 0.547561 0.664344 
S.E. of regression 1.383670 1.521079 
Log likelihood -219.8297 -232.1382 
F-statistic 14.01011 22.27688 
Number of countries 26 26 
Total number of Observations 130 130 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level & *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Annexure 6: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Dependent variable: Average values of Civil Liberties & Political Freedom indices 
 
Variables Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 
 
 
Constant 
1.60 *** 
(0.98) 
1.64 *** 
(0.98) 
2.32 ** 
(0.95) 
0.34  
(1.13) 
Speed of Reforms 
14.46 * 
(1.57) 
13.55 * 
(3.78) 
----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms Squared 
----- 6.85 
(24.83) 
----- ----- 
Speed of Reforms X Reforms 
----- ----- 4.62 * 
(0.43) 
----- 
Cumulative Economic Reforms   
----- ----- ----- 1.35 * 
(0.21) 
Economic Growth 
-0.005 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.006  
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.53 * 
(0.05) 
0.52 * 
(0.05) 
0.37 * 
(0.05) 
0.48 * 
(0.05) 
Log (Population) 
-0.13 * 
(0.03) 
-0.13 * 
(0.03) 
-0.10 * 
(0.03) 
-0.19 * 
(0.03) 
Democracy 
0.14 * 
(0.00) 
0.14 * 
(0.00) 
0.14 * 
(0.00) 
0.16 * 
(0.00) 
Oil Exports 
-0.40 * 
(0.12) 
-0.40 * 
(0.12) 
-0.36 * 
(0.11) 
-0.30 ** 
(0.12) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  
0.23 
(0.26) 
0.22 
(0.26) 
0.09 
(0.25) 
0.36 
(0.25) 
Socialist Legal System 
-0.29 * 
(0.08) 
-0.30 * 
(0.10) 
-0.35 * 
(0.08) 
0.28 * 
(0.08) 
Civil War 
-0.36 ** 
(0.15) 
-0.36 ** 
(0.15) 
-0.41 * 
(0.15) 
-0.42 ** 
(0.17) 
Peace Years 
0.01 * 
(0.00) 
0.01 * 
(0.00) 
0.01 * 
(0.00) 
0.003  
(0.00) 
Time 
-0.14 * 
(0.02) 
-0.14 * 
(0.02) 
-0.13 * 
(0.01) 
-0.24 * 
(0.02) 
Log (Reforms Years/ Communist Years) 
0.59 * 
(0.20) 
0.59 * 
(0.20) 
0.42 ** 
(0.21) 
0.68 * 
(0.22) 
 
R-squared 0.919248 0.919260 0.906310 0.903525 
Adjusted R-squared 0.916480 0.916253 0.903097 0.900218 
S.E. of regression 0.528383 0.529099 0.569141 0.577536 
Log likelihood -276.8855 -276.8577 -303.8589 -309.1743 
F-statistic 332.0222 305.6571 282.1426 273.1578 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 
Total number of Observations 364 364 364 364 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level & *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Graph 1       
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Graph 2 
 
Physical Integrity Rights (Avg) in later stages
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Graph 3 
 
Empowerment Rights (Avg) in early stages
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Graph 4 
 
Empowerment Rights (Avg) in later stages
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